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the absence of direct references, a characteristic which in the first volume was a mistake, but which in its successor becomes a defect of great importance. Many of M. Debidour's statements of fact should be made as conjectures or at least supported by the citation of definite authorities; such, for example, are his assertion of German intrigues in Morocco, his account of the origins of the Balkan League, and his description of Austrian encouragement to Bulgaria in 1913. When evidence is adduced it is not always adequate: a single paragraph from Bernhardt suffices as text for broad generalizations upon the German mentality, and the sole authority quoted as proof of Germany's aggressive intentions after 1911 is the French Yellow Book of 1914.

Should an American edition of M. Debidour's important work be undertaken, we may hope that the editor will adduce exact and adequate references for all unqualified statements of important facts. The bibliographies, which contain merely French authorities and are entirely uncritical, might also be amplified to advantage, while the brief index could certainly be extended and improved. With such corrections, students of recent European history would find in M. Debidour's work a manual of diplomacy which should prove constantly of the greatest value.

CHARLES SEYMOUR.

The Great War. By GEORGE H. ALLEN, Ph.D., HENRY C. WHITEHEAD, Captain in the United States Army, and Admiral F. E. CHADWICK, U. S. N. Volume II. *The Mobilization of the Moral and Physical Forces.* (Philadelphia: George Barrie's Sons. 1916. Pp. xxii, 494.)

At the present time issuing a history of the Great War might seem to commend itself more to publishers than to writers, for there must be enormous difficulty in composing such a work on the large scale here attempted in the limited time at one's disposal. The author truly says that no inconsiderable body of primary documents is now available, and it is likewise true that he makes effective use of the newspapers which will be consulted hereafter by those who write of these matters; but already the mass of material is overwhelming unless one has abundant time to go through it in leisurely fashion, which the plan of the present work precludes, while so close as yet are the events to be narrated and so difficult are problems of perspective and judgment, that only by accident or stroke of prophecy or genius could much that is brilliant or profound be combined with what is scholarly and careful. Such a book ought indeed to be written; I have myself read it with interest and without regret; and there is certainly an inexhaustible demand for information on this subject, which had better be satisfied by the work of cautious scholars than by journalists and partizan writers. But it is unnecessary to say that writing of this kind cannot have qualities of permanence or

greatness, and to some extent can only avoid the larger difficulties by staying near to the commonplace and that which is easily ascertainable. I do not mean to say this with the calm assumption of superiority which is sometimes so offensive in critical estimates. Rather it is a pleasure to declare that while going through this volume and bearing in mind the limitations under which the author was compelled to labor, there has been frequent and grateful surprise at the good results which nevertheless he accomplished.

The preceding volume dealt with the causes of the war. This one concerns the manner in which the conflict was begun, the last conversations of diplomats and statesmen, the despatches which were interchanged between the capitals of Europe in the waning days of sombre July and the first fateful week of August, with the comments of press, and the declarations made before legislatures as peoples were told of righteous cause and the Most High God invoked in vindication. Since nothing can be more absorbing than the official documents and contemporaneous accounts which have to do with these things, the author's task in following them is a happy one, and well does he do his work. There is something finely dramatic in his account of the memorable sessions of the Reichstag and the House of Commons, and he has thrown almost an antique-tragic air about the passion and terror which preceded the invasion of Belgium.

The author believes that before the war France was socialist and democratic, absorbed in domestic conflicts, with policies utterly opposed to military aggrandizement, and that under no conceivable circumstances would she have provoked a conflict for reconquering Alsace-Lorraine; that as late as the first of August few Englishmen expected war; that the well-known statements of Sir Edward Grey on July 29 were not intended to give assurance to France or threat to Germany, and that the effect produced was incidental not decisive; that Austria did not yield at the last, as some have supposed; that the civil authorities in Germany did not expect participation by England, though the military authorities regarded it as probable but unimportant; that long before, in every detail, Germany had planned the invasion of Belgium.

The second part of the volume most readers will find of less interest. There is lengthy statement of the military organization of the warring powers and also of their naval strength. The principal accounts are of Germany, Austria, Great Britain, Russia, and France. It cannot be said that the author displays improper prejudice for the Teutonic allies, but prolonged acquaintance with the German people has brought him thoroughly under the glamor of their achievements and their greatness. The German army is the exemplar and the pattern. He has no hesitation in saying that the men who make up this force are unsurpassed and "without equal in the world". He pronounces the British army to have been the most inadequate though probably the most excellent force in Europe. The Russians had numbers which in popular imagination

made them invincible, but the history of their army justified the conclusion that they would prove inferior man for man to those of the other great powers, and unless there had been improvement from fundamental reforms their exploits were bound to prove disappointing. Of France he makes judgment which might almost have been written before the present struggle began. He knows that her army was large, well trained, intelligent, and patriotic, but like some others he had noticed that French soldiers were not prepossessing in military bearing and appearance, not well "set up", and that they seemed without pride in being soldiers. He believes also that French military development was not that which should accompany the normal growth of a country; training was adopted as insurance against menace to the national existence and not as means of creating a healthy, self-reliant population, simple of taste and strong of heart, so that the very character of the army prepared it beforehand for a defensive war whenever the conflict should begin.

These chapters are less attractive than other portions of the work, and while they are useful they are less so than they should be. In each case they have historical introductions, too ambitious for their scanty length, some of which are not without error. For the most part, however, these pages contain numerous figures and data, which seem to have been collected with commendable thoroughness and set forth in good order, but withal put together by one having no very real acquaintance with military matters, and hence set down in the fashion of a catalogue, not complete enough for the special student and very wearisome for ordinary readers. There is lack of clear, trenchant, lucid generalization, and especially of interpretation, while the statistical comparisons might be better made in tables than by the narrative form in which they are expounded.

In the third part there is a chapter on the mobilization of financial resources, interesting and especially good as regards Great Britain and Germany; and finally one on the mobilization of the armies, in which after careful and cautious analysis the author concludes that following the mobilization of Servia, there was partial mobilization in Austria-Hungary July 28, which was extended to Galicia two days later, and made general August 1; that in Russia partial mobilization was ordered July 29, and made general on the first day of August.

There are some blemishes, but none of consequence. The statement about the good fortune of the Turks in securing, to effect their military reorganization, a selected body of the greatest military leaders of all time seems rather naïve (p. 258); it scarcely conveys the correct impression to say that Tsar Peter overran Sweden in 1719-1720 (p. 325); it remains to be seen whether sea power is not the supreme factor in this war (p. 371); I do not believe that England's anxiety at German naval development was owing to the fact that the British must always have a "scare" (p. 378).

The writing is clear and usually interesting though seldom inspiring. The principal fault which I have noticed in it is that at times there is lack of logical sequence with respect to paragraphs, as though some chapters had been written in parts and put together hastily afterwards.

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER.

The Elements of the Great War. By HILAIRE BELLOC. The First Phase, The Second Phase. (New York: Hearst's International Library Company. 1915, 1916. Pp. 379, 382.)

ONCE or twice in the course of a long and varied military career, we have met an officer so exceedingly homely that he attracted particularly our attention and even fascinated us. And this book with its guesses, its bitterness, its bias, its paucity of facts and plentitude of fancies, its worthless diagrams, its needless repetitions, its frequent digressions, and its obscure, awkward, and poor English, is, on the whole, so utterly bad that it is positively fascinating.

The book is intended to be a history of the "Great War" which began in the summer of 1914 between Germany and Austria on the one side, and France, England, and Russia on the other. The first volume explains the causes of the war, contrasts the opposing forces, and describes the operations in Belgium and France up to the battle of the Marne, and in Austria, Germany, and Russia to include Hindenburg's great victory over the Russians at Tannenberg in East Prussia.

The second volume concerns itself more especially, and almost entirely, with the great battle of the Marne, which resulted in stopping the onward rush of the Germans just short of their envelopment of Paris and in throwing them back upon the river Aisne, where they "dug themselves in" and formed that long line of intrenchments which has been held by them in great part from that day to this.

But the descriptions of the movements, actions, and battles of the contending armies occupy only a limited space in the two volumes; the greater part is devoted to diagrams and demonstrations and discussions of what the author is pleased to call, "The Elements of the Great War".

Perhaps the best thing in the whole book is the author's definition of war, which is as follows: "War is the attempt of two human groups each to impose its will upon the other by force of arms." There are also some few pages in the narrative part of the book deserving of praise; and it may likewise be said with truth, that if one can have the patience to read through the 750-odd pages of the book, of which just about three-quarters are rubbish, he will have a pretty fair idea of what happened in a general way in Belgium and France, and in Austria, Germany, and Russia in the first few months of the "Great War". But only in a general way; for neither the opposing numbers, nor the plans, nor the movements, nor the designations of the contending forces, were known in any detail at the time this history was written. And,